Finally, Debian has ditched OpenPGP for repository signing in favor of Ed25519 with SHA512. This is a step ahead for privacy and security. You can see the article here.

As @anon123@lemmy.ml pointed out, the following issues about PGP are not specifically related to Debian article I linked.

  • No authenticated encryption.
  • Receiving a signed message means nothing about who sent it to you
  • Usability issues with GnuPG
  • Discoverability of public keys issue.
  • Bad integration with emails.
  • No forward secrecy.

There’s usuful documentation about it:

  • @anon123@lemmy.ml
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    73 years ago

    including the subject (which is literally message content)

    All email clients with OpenPGP support that I am aware of encrypt the subject and have been doing so for years.

    PGP email is forward-insecure

    Forward secrecy is not a panacea.

    The GnuPG community, which mishandled the Efail disclosure

    This is misinformation. Rather it was only the GPG and the Kmail developers that handled the situation appropriately. (It was also not a vulnerability in GPG)

    Recommending email encryption to at-risk users is malpractice

    Yet he instead suggests signal which also leaks metadata and puts users in a much worse risk.

    • @Lunacy@lemmy.mlOP
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      13 years ago

      Hi, thank for your response. I understand your point; the issues I linked about PGP are not specifically related tod Debian article, I should have been more clear about it. Nonetheless, the weaknesses about PGP still remain.

      Forward secrecy is not a panacea.

      The weakness about PGP still remains. Forward secrecy it’s not a panacea, but it’s a useful feature. The approach Is way better than PGP.

      All email clients with OpenPGP support that I am aware of encrypt the subject and have been doing so for years.

      Even with OpenPGP support the subject of emails are not encrypted.

      Yet he instead suggests signal which also leaks metadata and puts users in a much worse risk.

      Can you elaborate please, maybe with source? As far as I understand signal minimize metadata

      • @TheAnonymouseJoker@lemmy.mlM
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        23 years ago

        Forward secrecy is a panacea for emails. Emails do not work like instant messenger protocols.

        ProtonMail is not an ideal example of encrypted email. If you could explain it with an email that allows custom PGP encryption, it would be a valid example.

        Signal is most likely a government op, considering it has its servers exclusively in USA, which are governed by US CLOUD Act, and Elon Musk nd Snowden promoted Signal. Similar actions happened with Wire Messenger, which was in Switzerland before, but later moved to USA. Wire was also promoted by Snowden and others in the same fashion.

        • @Lunacy@lemmy.mlOP
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          13 years ago

          Forward secrecy is a panacea for emails. Emails do not work like instant messenger protocols.

          I understand your point. However, that’s why email are not recommended as secure way to send/receive messages. Email, even when encrypted leaks metadata and lacks security features like forward secrecy. Email was not created with security in mind.

          ProtonMail is not an ideal example of encrypted email. If you could explain it with an email that allows custom PGP encryption, it would be a valid example.

          As far as I know, ProtonMail is considered the gold standard. Even then, encrypt subject in email it’s not possible even with custom PGP encryption. However, maybe I’m wrong here. Glad to be corrected.

          Signal is most likely a government op, considering it has its servers exclusively in USA, which are governed by US CLOUD Act, and Elon Musk nd Snowden promoted Signal. Similar actions happened with Wire Messenger, which was in Switzerland before, but later moved to USA. Wire was also promoted by Snowden and others in the same fashion

          I’m sorry but this statement doesn’t prove anything. Just because it’s plausible and common sense ( I don’t think this is the case to be honest) it doesn’t mean its also the truth. Signal has a good end to end encryption protocol with minimization of metadata. There are no evidence of backdoors.

          • @TheAnonymouseJoker@lemmy.mlM
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            13 years ago

            email was not created with security in mind

            This is true, and I do say it often. But emails have a culture around them, see mailing list culture. XMPP is email 2.0 to me, and to people who understand these protocols.

            ProtonMail is not a gold standard of anything except marketing. I am a R!seUp Collective member.

            Signal does not necessarily have backdoors, but metadata issues. And metadata going through US servers is an issue if you start talking to strangers. Moxie says it is not an app made for anonymity, and this was said during the blocking of USA software in Iran.

            • @Lunacy@lemmy.mlOP
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              3 years ago

              ProtonMail is not a gold standard of anything except marketing. I am a R!seUp Collective member.

              I searched for both ProtonMail and RiseUp features, I not found relevant differences. However, I never used RiseUp, maybe I’ll try.

              Signal does not necessarily have backdoors, but metadata issues. And metadata going through US servers is an issue if you start talking to strangers. Moxie says it is not an app made for anonymity, and this was said during the blocking of USA software in Iran.

              Nonetheless, Signal minimize the metadata. You can see here they received a subpoena from the United States Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California. However, they only provided two type of data:

              • last connection date
              • account created

              The entropy of data collected is very minimal.

              it’s not made for anonymity, but it’s still a private application.

              In my opinion (just my opinion, so you can skip this part) signal it’s safe to use for 99% of users.

                • @Lunacy@lemmy.mlOP
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                  3 years ago

                  Hi. I read the article. Specifically, the section about ProtonMail, RiseUP and disroot. I understand your point. ProtonMail has surely many issues.

                  Sincerely, I’m glad I don’t have to use email for communication, there are better alternatives like E2EE. Even using the most secure email provider your communication still leaks metadata. Actually, also E2EE leaks metadata, but the encryption protocol it’s way better than PGP.

                  You can see the metadata leaked by element here.

                  A question not related to this topic: there are communities dedicated to Opsec here?

                  Anyway, good discussion. :)

                  • @anon123@lemmy.ml
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                    23 years ago

                    E2EE is not a protocol. It just means “end to end encryption”. Signal, OpenPGP, Wire, OMEMO, etc all fit the description.

                  • @TheAnonymouseJoker@lemmy.mlM
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                    13 years ago

                    I do not think so, and even on reddit, r/opsec is very vague. For this reason, I have a guide for it https://lemmy.ml/post/34223 and have been trying to bring a change in the privacy community and in the culture to make it a pro libre and pro privacy culture via r/privatelife and c/privatelife.

                    I have helped a lot of people successfully, and continue to try and help communities and individuals in a hope for a changed future.

      • @anon123@lemmy.ml
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        23 years ago

        Forward secrecy it’s not a panacea, but it’s a useful feature

        With a lot of drawbacks (using it with multiple devices sucks) for too little gain and you can’t use it in non-interactive protocols such as OpenPGP. Or rather, you can if you do it manually, but it requires interaction.

        Even with OpenPGP support the subject of emails are not encrypted.

        Because Protonmail sucks. It works fine in Thunderbird.

        Can you elaborate please, maybe with source? As far as I understand signal minimize metadata

        I admit that it has been a while since I checked the signal protocol so I might be wrong. The page that you linked seems fine.

        • @Lunacy@lemmy.mlOP
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          13 years ago

          Because Protonmail sucks. It works fine in Thunderbird.

          Even if protonMail sucks, email will always leaks meatada.

          When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, including; To, From, Cc, Date, Subject.

          Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally and is also optional, therefore, only the message content is protected.

          When emails travel between email providers an encrypted connection is negotiated using Opportunistic TLS. This protects the metadata from outside observers, but as it is not E2EE, server administrators can snoop on the metadata of an email.

          Source

          With a lot of drawbacks (using it with multiple devices sucks) for too little gain and you can’t use it in non-interactive protocols such as OpenPGP. Or rather, you can if you do it manually, but it requires interaction.

          Acutally, forward secrecy it’s very useful.

          OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient’s private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. How do I protect my private keys?

          Source