It’s very clear that putin is a symptom and the cause is russian society (not every single person of course, but the overwhelming majority).

To some degree, I agree - but a detailed view is beneficial.

I’ll give the diagnosis first: Russia remains an empire with suppressed regions and suppressed ethnic groups. This feature almost guarantees that whoever rules will worry about separatism, is likely to grant lots of power to 3-letter agencies -> this means they’re available to repress domestic opposition.

The progression of the disease can be observed.

1980-ties: everyone was tired of the USSR being in stagnation and falling behind, preference for democracy became widespread, Gorbachev attempted reforms but lost control of the economy, allowed free elections and subsequently lost all authority (personality profile: he was economically incorruptible but also incompetent, and also an inefficient organizer).

1991: seeing Gorbachev lose control, the August coupers temporarily ousted him, but ended up triggering the dissolution of the USSR, since parallel power was already well developed on the level of individual SSRs (in Russia, it was vested in Yeltsin), but preference for democracy was still widespread in society. Military units disobeyed, people came to protest by large numbers.

1990-ties: everyone got tired of economic turmoil, corruption and organized crime. Yeltsin entered a power struggle with the Supreme Soviet and during the constitutional crisis, used military force against the parliament. He was still popular, but enacted reforms to give the president unchecked power. I would suggest that Yeltsin’s personality profile might have been “corrupt alcoholic with good instincts but despotic tendencies, average organizer”. Yeltsin knew his health was failing and popularity fading - he selected Putin, installed Putin and booted Putin up. And started giving three letter agencies unchecked power to fight Chechen separatism.

Half-diagnosis: it could have been different if the decision had been made to let Chechnia go. The decision to use armed forces to subdue separatism catalyzed both the arrival of Putin (he had a suitable profile to manage suppression) and created the environment for things to happen his way.

(At this point in the narrative, the agency of society starts decreasing and the agency of one guy starts increasing.)

2000s: the only period when the economy actually improved. Putin got the credit and was viewed as a saviour, despite having done little to achieve this. He welcomed the power Yeltsin handed him, protected Yeltsin and his accomplices from any review or prosecution, allowed Yeltsin’s family to keep stolen riches and let the ex-president die in peace. Meanwhile, he staffed media, law enforcement and armed services with loyal people, surrounded himself with accomplices and created a party (United Russia) to pretend democracy. The general population was experiencing economic improvement and were politically illiterate, they just let it happen. A characterization of Putin during this decade might be: efficient, motivated, corrupt, good organizer. Since nearly everyone was corrupt, nearly everyone could be blackmailed to comply. Every business oligarch or local leader could be told “we know what you’re doing, you could be charged 10 times over, but if you obey, we’ll let you continue doing it”. Personally, I think this approach was crucial. IMHO this was the recipe Russia was taken over with - Putin became the grand vizier of corruption. His hierarchy accepted it, controlled it and licensed it for obedience.

(At this point, opposition still existed and its main organizers weren’t threatened with death, but the playing field was already tilted against them.)

2008: war against Georgia boosted Putin’s ratings. “I have mastered the art of a small successful war” might have been his conclusion.

2010s: economic crisis hit the world and likewise hit Russia. Discontent appeared because living standards were dropping. Taking over the last bits of media was a struggle, resistance appeared. Elections could be already “won” without the people consenting (central TV and vote counting was under “good” control). Putin ran out of terms, but was not ready to drop pretenses. He needed cover and let Medvedyev rule for one term, then resumed presidency. The party he had created was handy for this purpose.

2014: revolution in Ukraine opened a window of opportunity, Putin calculated correctly that annexing Crimea without much resistance would bring him popularity as a military victor. Media was already fully controlled and presented him as such for maximum effect. Ukraine was unable to mount a defense. Western sanctions were half-assed. There was no downside, no punishment for the deed. “I have mastered the art of annexation,” might have been his conclusion. But he was growing old and increasingly surrounded by yes-men. He most likely started approving orders to kill opposition leaders, and some were indeed killed. The last effective opposition leader might have been Nemtsov. Navalny and Kara-Murza already had no hope, but tried regardless.

2022: threat of catching COVID has made Putin extremely isolated. Perhaps he’d become aware of being mortal and wanted to leave a legacy. Perhaps circles of yes-men assured him that yes-they-could (in three days). One thing could have still happened: the West (which had started raising defense spending in 2014, after Crimea) could have mounted a convincing deterrence. The West could have said “we’ll do everything it takes to keep Ukraine intact” and it would have worked. But the West did an unconvincing deterrence. Ukrainians probably didn’t fully believe he’d try to conquer, because they kind of knew his troops were too little to conquer them. And it started.

At this point, any critic could be labeled a traitor and disposed of in a wide variety of ways. People’s agency had reached a minimum. As the state ran into a dead end and Ukraine proved such a tough cookie to bite, people’s agency started very slowly rising, because he needs to arm a certain amount of people and the low-ranking loyal are increasinly dead. But it has not risen anywhere appreciable. :(

The ultimate problem, I think, is that people have been indifferent to injustice (as long as they have bread and circus), easy to manipulate (illiterate about politics and propaganda) and really poorly informed about world affairs (many haven’t ever traveled abroad, and speak no foreign language).

The task of manipulation becomes even easier if they have chip on their shoulder (e.g. perceived indignity of historical collapse). And even easier if large groups consume information only from Russian language TV - it can be taken over and used to brainwash them.

Now, after 2 decades of increasing deception / repression, they’re trapped. If they want out, they need to overthrow their institutions, but very few are capable of wanting that. Of my anarchist comrades, most are in exile or hiding, or in prison.

Levada’s recent study, unless I recall wrong, showed wide consensus among groups (even the “I don’t approve of Putin” group) that economic protest is not likely (less than 20% considered it possible) and political protest is even harder (I think this indicator was below 15%). Apparently extra bad in Moscow. In the regions, you might find space to disagree, but Moscow has central institutions, gets policed harder and excempted from burdensome measures. Putin wants the capital to be particularly safe for his reign.

I don’t know what will get him out, but speeches like the articles describes - will not. But it’s nice if people try. A challenge of some kind, even if doomed to fail, raises the social temperature at least a bit.