Finally, Debian has ditched OpenPGP for repository signing in favor of Ed25519 with SHA512. This is a step ahead for privacy and security. You can see the article here.
As @anon123@lemmy.ml pointed out, the following issues about PGP are not specifically related to Debian article I linked.
- No authenticated encryption.
- Receiving a signed message means nothing about who sent it to you
- Usability issues with GnuPG
- Discoverability of public keys issue.
- Bad integration with emails.
- No forward secrecy.
There’s usuful documentation about it:
There is no doubt. Along with Whonix many cryptography experts pointed out the weaknesses of PGP, for example:
About email encryption:
Source.
All email clients with OpenPGP support that I am aware of encrypt the subject and have been doing so for years.
Forward secrecy is not a panacea.
This is misinformation. Rather it was only the GPG and the Kmail developers that handled the situation appropriately. (It was also not a vulnerability in GPG)
Yet he instead suggests signal which also leaks metadata and puts users in a much worse risk.
Hi, thank for your response. I understand your point; the issues I linked about PGP are not specifically related tod Debian article, I should have been more clear about it. Nonetheless, the weaknesses about PGP still remain.
The weakness about PGP still remains. Forward secrecy it’s not a panacea, but it’s a useful feature. The approach Is way better than PGP.
Even with OpenPGP support the subject of emails are not encrypted.
Can you elaborate please, maybe with source? As far as I understand signal minimize metadata
With a lot of drawbacks (using it with multiple devices sucks) for too little gain and you can’t use it in non-interactive protocols such as OpenPGP. Or rather, you can if you do it manually, but it requires interaction.
Because Protonmail sucks. It works fine in Thunderbird.
I admit that it has been a while since I checked the signal protocol so I might be wrong. The page that you linked seems fine.
Even if protonMail sucks, email will always leaks meatada.
Source
Acutally, forward secrecy it’s very useful.
Source
Edited: wrong message.
Forward secrecy is a panacea for emails. Emails do not work like instant messenger protocols.
ProtonMail is not an ideal example of encrypted email. If you could explain it with an email that allows custom PGP encryption, it would be a valid example.
Signal is most likely a government op, considering it has its servers exclusively in USA, which are governed by US CLOUD Act, and Elon Musk nd Snowden promoted Signal. Similar actions happened with Wire Messenger, which was in Switzerland before, but later moved to USA. Wire was also promoted by Snowden and others in the same fashion.
I understand your point. However, that’s why email are not recommended as secure way to send/receive messages. Email, even when encrypted leaks metadata and lacks security features like forward secrecy. Email was not created with security in mind.
As far as I know, ProtonMail is considered the gold standard. Even then, encrypt subject in email it’s not possible even with custom PGP encryption. However, maybe I’m wrong here. Glad to be corrected.
I’m sorry but this statement doesn’t prove anything. Just because it’s plausible and common sense ( I don’t think this is the case to be honest) it doesn’t mean its also the truth. Signal has a good end to end encryption protocol with minimization of metadata. There are no evidence of backdoors.
This is true, and I do say it often. But emails have a culture around them, see mailing list culture. XMPP is email 2.0 to me, and to people who understand these protocols.
ProtonMail is not a gold standard of anything except marketing. I am a R!seUp Collective member.
Signal does not necessarily have backdoors, but metadata issues. And metadata going through US servers is an issue if you start talking to strangers. Moxie says it is not an app made for anonymity, and this was said during the blocking of USA software in Iran.
I searched for both ProtonMail and RiseUp features, I not found relevant differences. However, I never used RiseUp, maybe I’ll try.
Nonetheless, Signal minimize the metadata. You can see here they received a subpoena from the United States Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California. However, they only provided two type of data:
The entropy of data collected is very minimal.
it’s not made for anonymity, but it’s still a private application.
In my opinion (just my opinion, so you can skip this part) signal it’s safe to use for 99% of users.
Signal is generally fine, which is why I use it. Strangers is always risky to talk to, though.
ProtonMail is not even close to R!seUp, Disroot, Ctemplar and other providers. ProtonMail only leverages the name of Switzerland to look appealing. You can read on email providers here https://digdeeper.neocities.org/ghost/email.html
Hi. I read the article. Specifically, the section about ProtonMail, RiseUP and disroot. I understand your point. ProtonMail has surely many issues.
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Sincerely, I’m glad I don’t have to use email for communication, there are better alternatives like E2EE. Even using the most secure email provider your communication still leaks metadata. Actually, also E2EE leaks metadata, but the encryption protocol it’s way better than PGP.
You can see the metadata leaked by element here.
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A question not related to this topic: there are communities dedicated to Opsec here?
Anyway, good discussion. :)
Interesting. I know it is forward insecure, but this paper seems to be intriguing.